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AGUILAR v. Avis RENT A CAR SYSTEM, INC.
980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999)
FACTS
Plaintiffs were Latino employees of the Avis Rent A Car San Francisco
Airport facility.' As "drivers," plaintiffs moved Avis vehicles between parking
lots and from one airport location to another.2 Defendant John Lawrence was
the service station manager at the San Francisco Avis location.3 Defendant
Kathy Black was a supervisor at the same location.4
Plaintiffs filed suit against Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. and ten named
individuals, including defendants Lawrence and Black.5 The complaint
alleged (1) employment discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (hereinafter "FEHA");6 (2) wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4)
negligent infliction of emotional distress.7 The complaint, alleging that
Lawrence constantly verbally harassed plaintiffs,8 also requested injunctive
relief against both Lawrence prohibiting verbal harassment and Avis
prohibiting the allowance of such verbal harassment.9
The complaint further alleged that Black conducted a discriminatory
investigation by detaining and questioning only Latino employees regarding
a suspected theft of a calculator.'" During the investigation, Black brought in
a police officer and warned plaintiffs that if they did not cooperate in the
investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service would be
contacted." After finding the calculator the following day, Black apologized
to plaintiffs.' 2
On October 27, 1994, the jury returned special verdicts, finding that (1)
Black had unlawfully harassed or discriminated against five plaintiffs; (2)
1. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 849 (Cal. 1999).
2. Aguilar, 980 P.2d at 849.
3. 980 P.2d at 849.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12900 (West 1999). Section 12920 of the FEHA declares "as the public
policy of [California] it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek,
obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religious creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex,
or age." Id.
7. 980 P.2d at 849.
8. Lawrence allegedly referred to the Latino drivers using derogatory names, including
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Lawrence had unlawfully harassed or discriminated against four plaintiffs; and
(3) Avis knew or should have known of defendants' conduct and failed to stop
it13
Two months later, the trial court held a hearing regarding plaintiffs'
request for injunctive relief.'4 The court found that sufficient evidence existed
for the jury to find that as to four plaintiffs, Lawrence had engaged in acts of
harassment "so continual and severe as to alter the working conditions."' 5
After finding "a substantial likelihood based on [Lawrence's] actions that he
will [continue such action] in the future unless restrained," the court
determined that the injunction was appropriate. 6 In addition to entering
judgment against Avis and Lawrence, 7 the trial court issued an injunction that
stated as follows:
Defendant John Lawrence shall cease and desist from using any derogatory
racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino
employees of Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., and... further refrain from any
uninvited intentional touching of said Hispanic/Latino employees, as long as
he is employed by Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., in California.'8
The injunction also prohibited Avis from investigating or permitting
investigations that are limited to only Hispanic/Latino employees, "unless the
circumstances are such that no employees other than Hispanic/Latinos are
reasonably subjects or targets of such investigation(s)." '9
Defendants appealed the trial court's award of damages and the
"mandatory and prohibitory" injunction.' Specifically, they argued that the
injunction constituted a prior restraint, violating their First Amendment right





17. Damages were awarded against Avis: (I) in the amount of $15,000 each to the five employees
harassed by Black; and (2) in the amount of $25,000 each to the three employees harassed or discriminated
against by Lawrence. Damages were awarded against Lawrence in the amount of $25,000 each to three of
the four employees the jury found he harassed. Id.
18. id. at 850.
19. Id. The injunction further ordered Avis "to post certain notices advising employees to report any.
instances of discriminatory or harassing conduct by Avis or its employees and to publish a policy statement
in English and Spanish delineating employee rights and manager responsibilities with regard to employee
complaints of racial or national origin harassment or discrimination ... " Id. (internal quotations omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 848.
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recorder's transcript of the trial court proceedings as is customary, defendants
elected to provide only an appellants' appendix of the proceedings. 22
The California Court of Appeal rejected defendants' argument that the
injunction was a prior restraint, but agreed that the injunction's language
prohibiting "derogatory racial or ethnic epithets" was vague.2" The court
therefore reversed and remanded the injunction portion of the order.2 The
court directed the trial court to redraft the injunction to limit its scope to the
workplace, stating that an injunction that reached beyond the workplace
improperly exceeds the scope of the FEHA violation sought to be prevented.25
Lawrence and Avis challenged the Court of Appeal's order, arguing that even
the limited injunction constituted an improper restraint on freedom of
expression. The Supreme Court of California granted certiorari to determine
this issue.27
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of California, in a 4-3 decision, held that a remedial
injunction prohibiting the continued use of racial epithets in the workplace
does not violate the right to free speech, provided there has been a judicial
determination that the use of such epithets will contribute to a hostile or
abusive work environment. 28
ANALYSIS
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice George, began his analysis
with a definitional discussion of employment discrimination. 29 The relevant
form of employment discrimination at issue in this case was harassment on the
basis of race or national origin.30 The California Code of Regulations
specifically states that harassment of an employee is unlawful "if the entity, or
22. Id. Although providing a summarized appellant's appendix is a permissible procedural choice
(see CAL. Cr. R. 5.1 (1999)), the court viewed this election as risky and unfortunate in such an important
First Amendment case. As appellants, defendants bore the burden of providing a record on appeal that was
adequate to adjudicate their claims, see id at 864 (Werdegar, J., concurring).





28. Id. at 848.
29. Id. at 850.
30. Id. at 850-5 1. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (h)(1).
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its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of [the harassment] and
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.'
The California courts have adopted the same standard for evaluating
claims under the FEHA as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized in the
context of sexual harassment.32 To be actionable, the harassment complained
of must be "sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment., 33 The harassment cannot be
"isolated, sporadic, or trivial[;] rather the plaintiff must show a concerted
pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or generalized nature.,
34
The plurality established that Lawrence's conduct created a hostile or
abusive work environment on the basis of race.35 The court then examined
whether prospective relief was necessary to prevent the recurrence of that
unlawful conduct, as the FEHA specifically provides for prospective
remedies.36
Despite the trial court's finding that there is "a substantial likelihood based
on [Lawrence's] actions that he will [harass and discriminate] in the future
unless restrained,"37 defendants argued that the injunction was improper
because the record did not show that Lawrence "engaged in ongoing conduct
that arguably might justify injunctive relief.' 38 The court determined that, in
order to prevail on this claim, defendants must show that the finding by the
trial court was not supported by substantial evidence.39 However, the court
stated that because defendants elected not to provide the Court of Appeal with
a transcript of the trial court proceedings, defendants had no basis upon which
to prove that the injunction was unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial.'
Thus, defendants could support their claim only with the inference from the
trial court's comments that Lawrence had ceased his unlawful conduct during
the pendency of the proceedings.4 The court concluded that the trial court did
31. Id. at 851 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7287.6 (b)(1)(A) (1999)). Harassment is defined
to include "verbal harassment, e.g. epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis enumerated in the
Act[.J" 980 P.2d at 851. Verbal harassment may also constitute employment discrimination under the
federal counterpart of the FEHA, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
32. Id. at 851.
33. Id. (quoting Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 608 (1989)).
34. Id. (quoting Fisher, 214 Cal. App. at 610).
35. Id. at 852. Lawrence conceded that the jury findings that he had violated the FEHA were
supported by substantial evidence.
36. Id. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920.5 provides: "In order to eliminate discrimination, it is necessary
to provide effective remedies that will both prevent and deter unlawful employment practices and redress
the adverse effects of those practices on aggrieved persons."
37. 980 P.2d at 852-853 (quoting Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., No. 948597 (San Fran.
Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1995)).
38. Id.
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not err in finding that there was a substantial likelihood that Lawrence would
continue his unlawful actions unless restrained.42 The court further
emphasized that "[t]he mere fact that a defendant refrains from unlawful
conduct during the pendency of a lawsuit does not necessarily preclude the
trial court from issuing injunctive relief to prevent a post trial continuation of
the unlawful conduct.
4 3
Defendants' next argued that the injunction was a prior restraint on their
rights to free speech, and that it was therefore invalid under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under the California Constitution, art.
1, § 2." The court disagreed.45
The court first addressed the claim under the U.S. Constitution."' The
court emphasized that while the right to free speech is stated in broad terms,
it is not absolute. 47 The court implicitly suggested that speech of this nature
is not constitutionally protected, citing the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson48 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.4950 These
two decisions held that the use of sufficiently severe or pervasive racial
epithets constitutes employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
FEHA.5 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court explicated that under certain
circumstances spoken words are not constitutionally protected. 2 Drawing on
these cases, the court asserted "that the First Amendment permits imposition
of civil liability for past instances of pure speech that create a hostile work
environment.
53
Similarly, the court determined that the First Amendment also permits the
issuance of an injunction to prohibit the continuation of such discriminatory
actions. 54 Under well established law, the injunction is not invalid as a prior
restraint, "because the order was issued only after the jury determined that
defendants had engaged in employment discrimination, and the order simply







48. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
49. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
50. 980 P.2d at 854.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (providing sexually derogatory
"fighting words" as an example of speech that is not constitutionally protected)).
53. Id. at 855.
54. ld. at 856.
55. Id. at 856-858. See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The United States
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that an injunction against speech will generally not be considered an
2000]
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interpreting several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,56 the court
determined that in each case the Supreme Court "recognize[d] that once a
court has found that a specific pattern of speech is unlawful, an injunctive
order prohibiting the repetition, perpetuation, or continuation of that practice
is not a prohibited 'prior restraint' of speech. 57 The court therefore concluded
that "the pervasive use of racial epithets that has been judicially determined to
violate the FEHA is not protected by the First Amendment, and such unlawful
conduct properly may be enjoined."5"
Next, the court turned to defendants' claim that the injunction violated the
California Constitution.59 Defendants relied on Dailey v. Superior Court6 in
which the California Supreme Court found that a superior court order
constituted a prior restraint in violation of the California Constitution.6 , The
court distinguished Dailey as involving a true prior restraint, not an injunction
prohibiting conduct that has been judicially determined to be unlawful. 62 The
court then denied defendants' claim explaining that the broad language of the
California Constitution could not be interpreted to protect all speech in every
circumstance. 63 The court concluded that under the California Constitution,
unconstitutional prior restraint if it is issued after ajury has determined that the speech is not constitutionally
protected.").
56. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973) (upholding Georgia which "imposed
no restraint on the exhibition of [obscene materials] until after a full adversary proceeding and a final
judicial determination ... that the materials were constitutionally unprotected"); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Rel. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388-389 (1973) (upholding order prohibiting a newspaper from
publishing advertisements in manner that would constitute employment discrimination); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (stating that "only a procedure requiring ajudicial determination suffices
to impose a valid final restraint"); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961) (rejecting the
argument that a municipal ordinance requiring "submission of all motion pictures for examination prior to
their public exhibition" constituted a prior restraint on expression); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436, 440 (1957) (rejecting argument that criminal provision authorizing limited injunctive remedy
prohibiting distribution of booklets found after due trial to be obscene amounts to prior censorship and
thereby violates First Amendment).
57. 980 P.2d at 858.
58. Id. at 859.
59. Id. (quoting CAL. CONS'r., art. I, § 2(a) ("Every person may freely speak, write or publish his or
her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press.")).
60. Dailey v. Superior Court, 44 P. 458, 460 (Cal. 1896) (invalidating as prior restraint in violation
of First Amendment superior court order prohibiting performance or advertising of play that was based upon
circumstances of pending criminal case).
61. 980 P.2d at 860.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 860-61. See Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 122 (Cal. 1975) (recognizing that
injunction restraining speech may be issued to protect private rights or to prevent deceptive commercial
practices); People ex. rel Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 550 P.2d 600, 609 (1976) (stating "[ilt is
entirely permissible from a constitutional standpoint to enjoin further exhibition of specific magazines or
films which have been finally adjudged to be obscene following a full adversary hearing"); People ex rel.
Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 610-611 (Cal. 1997) (explaining that specific injunction, issued against
particular party on basis of proven past course of conduct, poses less of danger to free speech interests than
general statutory prohibition).
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like the U.S. Constitution, the injunction was not a prior restraint of speech,
"because defendants simply were enjoined from continuing a course of
repetitive speech that had been judicially determined to constitute unlawful
harassment in violation of the FEHA." 64
Finally, defendants argued that even if the injunction was permissible, the
trial court's order was too broad.6 ' However, because the trial court added an
exemplary list of prohibited speech to limit the scope of the injunction to the
workplace, and as neither party sought review of that limitation, the court
determined that the issue was not proper.66 Nevertheless, the court did respond
to defendants' claim that, even with the limitation, the injunction was overly
broad because it enjoined Lawrence's speech even when he is outside the
hearing of plaintiffs and other Latino employees. 67 Refusing to accept that
argument, the court emphasized that the use of racial epithets even outside the
hearing of plaintiffs would still contribute to the atmosphere of racial hostility
and would perpetuate the hostile work environment created by defendants.68
In affirming the appellate court, the plurality concluded by repeating the trial
court's finding that, "[b]ecause Lawrence's past use of racial epithets in the
workplace had been judicially determined to violate the FEHA, prohibiting
[Lawrence] from continuing this discriminatory activity does not constitute an
invalid prior restraint of speech. 69
CONCURRING OPINION
In Justice Werdegar's concurring opinion, he opined that the plurality
should have confronted the fundamental question of whether speech that
creates a racially hostile work environment is protected by the First
Amendment. 70 Concluding that such speech is not protected,7' Justice
Werdegar found the plurality's holding to be justified because it involved
"speech occurring in the workplace, an unwilling and captive audience, a
64. Id. at 861.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 861-862.
68. Id. at 862.
69. Id. at 863 (quoting Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., No. 948597 (San Fran. Super. Ct.
Feb. 14, 1995)).
70. Id. at 865 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
71. Justice Werdegar recognized that the Supreme Court decisions in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983), CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), and NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), demonstrate that strong public policies governing the workplace, whether public or private, may
justify some limitations on an employer's or employees' First Amendment rights. Id. at 870-871 (Werdegar,
J., concurring).
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compelling state interest in eradicating racial discrimination, and ample
alternative speech venues for the speaker."72
DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justices Mosk, Kennard, and Brown dissented, each characterizing the
injunction as a prior restraint under both the U.S. Constitution and the
California Constitution.73 Judge Mosk opined that the California Constitution
provides a speech protective provision "more definitional and inclusive" than
the First Amendment.74 Thus, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the California
Constitution plainly permitted holding defendants responsible for any abuse
of the right, but did not permit a prior restraint in the form of an injunction."
In their respective dissents, Justice Mosk and Justice Kennard cited two
reasons for the invalidity of the injunction.76 First, the record failed to
establish that the injunction was necessary to prevent a recurrence of
defendants' wrongful acts of employment discrimination. 77 Second, the
injunction was not narrowly tailored, because it prohibited Lawrence from
addressing epithets to any Hispanic employee, not just the four plaintiffs
whom Lawrence harassed.78
Justice Brown accused the plurality of recognizing "the FEHA exception
to the First Amendment," 79 and merely brushing aside the important
constitutional protection of an individual's right to free speech with little
analysis or authority.80 She viewed the damages remedy against defendants as
"sufficient to deter any unwanted racial discrimination" by creating a middle
ground between upholding the injunction as a prior restraint and subjecting
plaintiffs to employment discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The Aguilar decision hinged on finding the appropriate balance between
two fundamental rights, equality and freedom of expression. However, the
balance invoked by the plurality in this case was heavily influenced by
defendants' failure to provide the Court of Appeal a transcript of the trial court
72. 1& at 875 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
73. d at 878-95 (Mosk, Kennard & Brown, J.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 881 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson, 532 P.2d at 120).
75. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
76. I. at 878-882.
77. i. at 878 (Mosk, J., dissenting) and at 882 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 878 (Mosk, J., dissenting) and at 886 (Kennard, ., dissenting).
79. Id. at 891 (Brown, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 893 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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proceedings. The consequence of defendants' failure to include the factual
record was clearly a distinguishing feature between the differing plurality and
dissenting opinions.
Defendants may have utilized this strategy in hopes that the California
Supreme Court would not have sufficient evidence before it to uphold the
injunction.8 However, the absence of the trial court transcript ultimately had
the opposite effect. The California Supreme Court upheld the injunction
determining that, without the factual record, defendants could not show that
the injunction was unsupported by evidence adduced at trial.82 The dissenters,
on the other hand, found that without the factual record the injunction failed
to overcome the speech's presumption of constitutionality.83
The conflict between the fundamental rights of equality and freedom is
perhaps not resolvable. In attempting to strike an appropriate balance, courts
tend to rely on some outside factor, however insignificant. Here, the court
used the strategic absence of a factual record as a basis for determining whose
rights should prevail.
The Aguilar decision has prompted controversy. The ACLU of Northern
California, an organization that usually defends outrageous speech, supported
the court's decision. Dorothy M. Erhlich, executive director of the ACLU of
Northern California, San Francisco, said that the ACLU supports the right to
equality as much as First Amendment rights. 4 Moreover, "where companies
fail to protect workers from race discrimination, courts must act. The
Constitution holds out a promise of equality as well as expressive freedom.""
However, Margaret Crosby, also on staff at the ACLU of Northern California,
feels that this decision is only a modest attempt to secure equality and will
have little impact.8 6 Lawrence retains his right to walk outside on the street
and hurl racial slurs at passing strangers.87 The injunction provides only a
limited restraint on discriminatory speech. 8 In precluding such speech only
8!. First Amendment principles settled since New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285 (1964),
require an appellate court to independently examine the record to assure that restrictions on free speech are
justified.
82. 980 P.2d at 852.
83. Id. at 879 (Mask, J., dissenting). See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)
(stating that "[any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity").
84. Dorothy M. Ehrlich, Court Enjoins Use of Racial Slurs in Workplace, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, September 25, 1999, at Opinion.
85. Id. at Opinion.
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in the workplace, the attempted goal of securing equality can never be
reached.89
Some attorneys recognize that this decision may create "daunting, if not
insurmountable" enforcement problems for employers, in addition to exposing
the employers to penalties.9° Other attorneys feel the decision will result in
little impact because the ruling was so specific to Avis' situation. 9'
Where employment discrimination exists, not only are monetary damages
appropriate, but individuals can be enjoined from continuing to make
harassing and discriminatory remarks in the workplace. Hopefully, this
decision will prompt employers to protect themselves by implementing
comprehensive anti-harassment policies that discourage discrimination.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
J. Meredith Guthrie
89. Id.
90. William Bennett Turner, First Amendment Gets Worked Over, THE RECORDER, August 18, 1999,
91. Id.
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